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For decades, local governments have used the power of eminent domain to evict 
low-income residents across the United States. Reversing this trend of government-
sanctioned displacement, the City of Richmond, California has developed an 
innovative use of eminent domain to keep residents in their homes and prevent 
foreclosure. By using the power of eminent domain to purchase underwater mortgages 
developed during the housing bubble at today’s market value, Richmond could save 
residents thousands of dollars and allow them to stay in their homes. This approach 
has met with strong resistance from Wall Street, where these mortgages have become 
profitable investment vehicles. Richmond’s success will be based on the City’s ability 
to develop new partnerships with activists and investors outside the municipal 
boundaries.
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merican cities and millions of Americans 
continue to face challenges caused by the 
Great Recession. Foreclosures evict families 
from their homes, inflict blight on neighborhoods, 
and cut city revenues that provide basic services. 
To stem this tide, the City of Richmond, California 
is attempting to use eminent domain to purchase 
underwater mortgages, refinance the houses at 
current values, and keep the city’s residents in 
their homes. However, Richmond has faced strong 
resistance from Wall Street, which has converted 
those mortgages into profit-generating investment 
vehicles. If Richmond and other cities working for 
their residents are to succeed in the future, they 
must develop new partnerships outside of their 
city limits. 
t h e  p r o b l e m :
U n d e r w at e r  M o r t g a g e s ,  F o r e c l o s u r e s , 
a n d  A m e r i c a n  C i t i e s
Seven years after the beginning of the Great 
Recession, American cities continue to deal 
with its aftermath. One of the most significant 
challenges for cities and homeowners has been 
the loss of housing values. Almost a quarter of all 
homes with a mortgage, nearly eleven million, are 
“underwater – meaning that the balance on the 
mortgage exceeds the current value of the home” 
(Hockett, 2013, p. 1). Foreclosures have increased 
as homeowners continue to make payments on 
peak housing prices while facing unemployment 
and wage cuts. Across the country, three million 
homeowners are in the foreclosure process, 
with an additional 7.5 million expected to enter 
foreclosure in the near future (Hockett, 2013). 
While the problems of underwater mortgages 
and foreclosures are national in scope, they have 
been concentrated in a few municipalities, “most 
notably [in] California, which in 2011 boasted ten 
of the nation’s top twenty municipal foreclosure 
rates” (Friend, 2013, p. 26). For example in San 
Bernardino County, near Los Angeles, housing 
prices fell by half from their high in 2006, leaving 
over fifty percent of the mortgages underwater 
(Friend, 2013). In Richmond, California, the focus 
of the case study, housing values decreased by 
over sixty percent, leaving nearly a third of the 
mortgages underwater. This caused 16 percent 
of homeowners to lose their homes through 
foreclosure (Dewan, 2014).
Unsurprisingly, the scale of the loss of housing 
values and foreclosures has had a significant 
impact on municipalities and their residents. As 
housing values dropped and foreclosures rose, 
local property tax revenues have fallen (Hockett, 
2013). This has led municipalities to cut services, 
consolidate school districts, and, in some cases, 
file for bankruptcy, as San Bernardino County 
did in August of 2012 (Friend, 2013; Hockett, 2013). 
Residents who have been able to keep their 
homes face abandoned neighborhoods, decreased 
housing values caused by blight, and increased 
crime (Hockett, 2013), (Friend, 2013).
The logical response to underwater mortgages for 
cities, homeowners, and the banks that provided 
the loans is the reduction of principal. Reducing 
the principal of the mortgage has been more 
effective in preventing defaults than extending 
the mortgage’s term or reducing the interest rate 
(Friend, 2013). Since banks are aware of the high 
rates of foreclosure associated with underwater 
mortgages, “they find it financially rational to write 
down these loans” to prevent homeowners from 
foreclosing (Hockett, 2013, p. 3). 
However, nearly ten percent of the mortgage 
market – $1 trillion – takes the form of private-
label securitization (PLS) mortgages, which are 
structured to make principal reduction difficult 
(Friend, 2013; Hockett, 2013). After the banks 
loaned to homeowners, the PLS mortgages 
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were “split into countless pieces and made into 
bonds,” which become investment vehicles on 
Wall Street (Friend, 2013, p. 27). Any reduction of 
principal requires agreement by a supermajority 
of investors, who have no way of communicating 
with each other (Hockett, 2013; Friend, 2013). 
Additionally, the banks who manage the 
mortgages for the investors are prohibited from 
reducing the mortgage’s principal independently 
(Hockett, 2013). This presents a huge problem for 
municipalities, since PLS mortgages “are about 
three times as likely as other kinds to default” 
(Friend, 2013, p. 27).
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n :
E m i n e n t  D o m a i n
Fortunately, cities faced with toxic PLS mortgages 
and foreclosures have a solution – “take definitive 
ownership” of the mortgages through the 
power of eminent domain (Friend, 2013, p. 27). 
Municipalities and counties can use eminent 
domain to purchase “the underwater mortgages 
at below the home’s market value and to refinance 
them at lower rates” (The Economist, 2014). By 
reducing the principal of the loan from the pre-
recession peak price to the current market value, 
cities can significantly reduce owners’ monthly 
mortgage payments. For example, by reducing the 
mortgage of a house that sold in 2006 for $300,000 
to its current value of $190,000, a homeowner could 
save $700 a month or $8,400 a year, significant 
savings for a homeowner (Friend, 2013). The 
investors who purchased the PLS mortgages 
would receive 80 percent of the fair market value, 
a higher return than default and foreclosure would 
bring (Friend, 2013).
To limit the municipality’s expenses, it could 
use federal or private funds to purchase the 
underwater mortgages (Hockett, 2013). In the case 
of Richmond, Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP) 
gathered $400 million from private investors to 
purchase the underwater mortgages (Friend, 2013). 
Investors purchased mortgages at 80 percent of 
the current market value and refinanced them 
at 100 percent of the home’s fair market value – 
gaining a 20 percent profit (Friend, 2013). 
Continuing the preceding example, the 
municipality would purchase the mortgage for a 
house with a peak value of $300,000 and a current 
value of $190,000 for 80 percent of its current 
value, at a price of $152,000, and then refinance at 
its current value, resulting in a 20 percent profit, 
or $38,000.  One-third of the profits would go to 
the city, one-third to investors, and the remainder 
would cover MRP’s fees and closing costs (Friend, 
2013). Current investors in PLS mortgages 
would be invited to participate in the purchase 
of underwater mortgages to help them “recoup 
presently lost value” by the threat of foreclosure 
(Hockett, 2013).
Figure 1
2006 - Peak housing prices: $300,000 
market value, $300,000 mortgage.
2013 - Underwater with high risk of default: 
$190,000 market value, $300,0000 mortgage.
2013 - Eminent domain to refinance mortgage: 




H i s t o r y  a n d  P r e c e d e n c e
Academics, politicians, and investors have 
proposed the use of eminent domain to purchase 
underwater mortgages. Robert Hockett of Cornell 
Law School argued in the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York’s Current Issues in Economics and 
Finance that condemning purchases using 
eminent domain is both legally and financially 
prudent (Hockett, 2013; The Economist, 2014). In 
2008, Republican presidential candidate John 
McCain argued for using “$300 billion in federal 
bailout money to buy troubled mortgages and 
write them down” (Dewan, 2014). Futhermore, 
the founders of Mortgage Resolution Partners 
had extensive history on Wall Street working for 
Credit Suisse and Zurich Financial services before 
deciding “to use their financial fluency to restore 
millions of people’s balance sheets” (Friend, 2013, 
p. 29).
Legally, there is a long history of using eminent 
domain to purchase forms of intangible property, 
such as “bond tax exemption covenants, insurance 
policies, corporate equities, other contract 
rights” (Hockett, 2013, p. 4). Additionally, the 
use of eminent domain has always been tied to 
“preventing more foreclosures, blighted properties, 
revenue base losses, and city service cutbacks,” 
which purchasing underwater mortgages aims 
to achieve (Hockett, 2013, p. 6). In the broader 
American legal context, bankruptcy facilitates 
debt reduction, which allows entrepreneurs to 
launch businesses and firms to recover lost value 
(Hockett, 2013). 
K e y  A c t i o n s  a n d  C h a l l e n g e s  i n 
R i c h m o n d ,  C a l i f o r n i a
In 2013, the working-class, predominantly 
Hispanic and African-American City of Richmond 
continued to feel the effects of the recession 
with almost a third of its mortgages underwater 
(Dewan, 2014). Faced with this continuing crisis, 
Mayor Gayle McLaughlin and her progressive 
city council, who had already decriminalized 
homelessness and supported the rights of illegal 
immigrants, began discussions with Mortgage 
Resolution Partners to use their funds to purchase 
the underwater mortgages and help keep residents 
in their homes (Dewan, 2014). As a result, in July 
of 2013 Richmond offered 80 percent of current 
market value to the investors in 624 private-label 
security mortgages before beginning the process 
of purchasing the mortgages through eminent 
domain (Dewan, 2014; The Economist, 2014).
With incredible speed, national opposition to 
the purchase of 624 mortgages developed. In 
August of 2013, large asset-management firms, 
including BlackRock and PIMCO (which managed 
investment in bonds containing private-label 
security mortgages) and their trustees, Wells Fargo 
and Deutsche Bank sued to prevent the use of 
eminent domain (Dewan, 2014). Homeowners with 
underwater mortgages are at risk of defaulting, 
but as long as owners continue to make high 
payments based on peak housing prices, they 
help keep the bonds formed from slivers of PLS 
mortgages afloat (Friend, 2013). In the case of 
Richmond, the asset-management firms argued 
that more than half of the 624 homeowners were 
current on their mortgage payments (Dewan, 2014). 
If the city went ahead and purchased those loans 
at 80 percent of current market value, not only 
would the investors lose money, but they would 
also lose future payments that would support the 
bonds. If Richmond’s use of eminent domain were 
to set a national precedent, Wall Street feared that 
Nearly ten percent of the 
mortgage market is private-label 
securitization mortgages, which 
are structured to make principal 
reduction difficult and are three 
times more likely to default.
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investors would no longer trust bonds containing 
PLS mortgages (Friend, 2013), reducing the bonds’ 
values and depriving asset-management firms of a 
profitable vehicle to offer their investors. However, 
since the city had not yet used eminent domain to 
purchase the houses, the federal court rejected the 
investors’ suit as premature (The Economist, 2013).
Beyond litigation, opponents moved to block 
the city’s access to private and federal money. 
The Securities Industry and Financial Market 
Association (SIMFA), which promotes investment 
in bonds containing PLS mortgages, complained to
the city’s bond underwriter that an upcoming plan 
to refinance municipal bonds “did not adequately 
disclose the risks of the mortgage plan” (Dewan, 
2014). The city’s subsequent attempt to refinance 
its municipal bonds in August, 2013 received no 
buyers, despite the bonds’ high rating (Dewan, 
2014). Discouraging buyers from purchasing 
municipal bonds could limit Richmond’s ability 
to fund public projects in the future. Additionally, 
SIMFA is working to persuade Congress to prevent 
federal guarantees for any new mortgages made 
in a municipality that has authorized the use 
of eminent domain to purchase underwater 
mortgages (Dewan, 2014). This could significantly 
decrease the value of Richmond’s homes, as banks 
avoid making loans not backed by the federal 
government to prospective buyers.
In the face of this strong resistance, which had 
stymied a similar effort in San Bernardino, 
Richmond officials partnered with Alliance of 
Californians for Community Empowerment 
(ACCE) to engage residents and build public 
support (Dewan, 2014). The city of Richmond and 
ACCE also reached out to unions, including the 
Service Employees International Union, which saw 
many of their members trapped in underwater 
mortgages (Dewan, 2014). This coalition-building 
and grassroots campaign helped motivate over 100 
residents to speak out at a September city council 
meeting, where the city held the first of many votes 
needed to approve the use of eminent domain, which 
passed with four of the seven council members’ 
votes (Dewan, 2014). However, since California 
law requires a super-majority to pursue eminent 
domain, Richmond is considering partnering with a 
neighboring city to form a joint powers authority with 
eminent domain powers that could be formed with a 
simple majority (The Economist, 2014; EfficientGov, 
2014). If successful, Richmond’s use of eminent 
domain to protect homeowners may inspire cities 
across California and across the country to follow suit 
(The Economist, 2014).
I m p l i c at i o n s  a n d  A n a ly s i s
The conflict surrounding Richmond’s use of eminent 
domain can be understood as a clash between the 
use and exchange value derived from property. Real 
estate can provide both values at the same time, 
often to two different groups. For example, renters 
derive use value from living in an apartment, while 
the owner derives exchange value from the rent 
Figure 2
The City of Richmond used eminent domain to purchase mortgages and 
refinance at current market values. Refinanced mortgages significantly reduce 
payments, helping more than 600 homeowners avoid foreclosure.
Mayor + City Council  propose 
using eminent domain to assist 
homeowners facing foreclosure
The Alliance of  Californians 
for Community Empowerment 
launches grassroots campaign
City of  Richmond uses eminent 
domain to purchase mortgages
Mortgage Resolution Partners 
provide $400m from private investors 
for city to purchase mortgages
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that the apartment earns (Logan & Harvey, 1987). 
In the case of Richmond, homeowners derive 
use value from living in their homes, in intact 
neighborhoods and with access to good schools 
and work. By contrast, banks, investors, and 
asset-management firms derive exchange value 
from the monthly payments those homeowners 
make on their mortgages. As the struggle over 
the mortgages in Richmond has illustrated, 
“the simultaneous push for both [exchange and 
use values] is inherently contradictory and 
a continuing source of tension, conflict, and 
irrational settlement” (Logan & Harvey, 1987, p. 2).
Previously, that conflict played out in a limited 
geographic area, as residents deriving use value 
and entrepreneurs or investors deriving exchange 
value lived in the same neighborhood, city, or 
region. However, in Richmond, homeowners still 
derive use value from living in a specific location, 
while investors in PLS mortgages live all across 
the country and even across the world. This 
means, first, that investors are less concerned with 
the fortunes of a local community than property 
owners were in the past. Second, since investors 
collectively do not live in a specific location inside 
municipal boundaries, it is more difficult for a 
city to compel them to protect the use value of 
homes than in the past. Instead, investors can 
compel cities to action (or inaction) by controlling 
their access to capital, as demonstrated by the 
investors’ successful effort to thwart Richmond 
from refinancing their municipal bonds.
This means that for cities to serve their citizens, 
they will need to develop new partnerships outside 
city limits. One of these partnerships will be, 
paradoxically, with these same investors. While 
it is easy to criticize those who pursue exchange 
value, the American legal structure protects and 
promotes that pursuit. So the effort of Mortgage 
Resolution Partners to gather private funds to buy 
mortgages gives Richmond the opportunity to 
present the use of eminent domain to Wall Street 
not as a threat, but as an investment opportunity. If 
enough investors find the purchase of underwater 
mortgages profitable, asset-management firms, 
like BlackRock, may stop suing the city and 
instead start buying the mortgages themselves. 
This would allow Richmond to promote its 
residents’ use value, while not threatening 
investors’ exchange value.
Other partners include groups like Alliance of 
Californians for Community Empowerment 
(ACCE), which can work across city and state 
boundaries to promote use value in specific 
communities. By providing cities like Richmond 
support and knowledge, ACCE’s members can 
help empower residents to speak out and support 
local officials in the face of national opposition. 
Their connections across city and state lines 
can help spread the work of Richmond to other 
communities that are working to help residents. 
This means that even if the use of eminent 
domain is defeated in Richmond, it could emerge 
stronger and wiser in another community, which 
will finally succeed in protecting the use value 
of residents and keeping homeowners in their 
homes.
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